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INTRODUCTION 
It has been written, somewhat hyperbolically, that we are at “the 
end of history.”1 In this worldview, the liberal democratic order has so 
taken hold throughout the world that only forms of government based 
on popular sovereignty and representation will emerge and thrive 
from now until the end of the state system.2 The current wave of 
democratization that has taken root throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa seems an affirmation of this statement. Even while many 
populations do not yet find themselves under the flags of freedom and 
individual rights, the great majorities in many authoritarian and 
despotic societies long for such liberties. 
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1 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 4 
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Underneath the protests that have been seen in places such as 
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria lay additional desires beyond simply 
the right to have a say in the future of the state. The protestors desire 
prosperity and economic security.3 The people in the street not only 
dream of freedom, they also dream of employment and a road out of 
poverty. Put simply, it is not only the desire of protestors to see their 
children able to choose leadership and freely speak their mind—they 
would also like to ensure that those children can be educated and 
support a families of their own some day. 
Much academic attention has been paid to the relationship between 
a liberal, democratic political system and economic advancement. In 
particular, it has been widely argued that capitalism leads to 
democracy. At the risk of vastly oversimplifying these arguments, the 
creation of an upper and a middle class that will inevitably desire a 
greater say in the policy decisions of the state. These new upper and 
middle classes then demand democracy in an effort to gain this input.4 
However, in recent years this literature has been disputed as the world 
has seen the great emergence of economic powers without western-
style liberal democracy. 
The most prominent of these examples is China, where traditional 
multiparty democracy has never emerged despite incredible economic 
growth. The country instead follows a system often referred to as 
intra-party democracy, where the Communist Party controls all 
aspects of public life, but there are factions within the party with 
different policy goals.5 This keeps the populace from choosing leaders 
but allows for some policy and leadership debate within the ruling 
party.6 While there have been many isolated calls for greater 
freedoms, a widespread regime-change movement has yet to emerge. 
The economic miracle that has existed in the Middle Kingdom over 
the last few decades serves as an important contrast to the traditional 
belief that capitalism and liberal democracy are fully intertwined.7 
 
3 Michael Schuman, Why the Arab Spring’s Success Depends on Jobs, Not Guns, TIME 
(Aug. 22, 2011), http://business.time.com/2011/08/22/why-the-arab-springs-success-de 
pends-on-jobs-not-guns/. 
4 See generally Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & John D. Stephens, The 
Impact of Economic Development on Democracy, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (1993); Robert J. 
Barro, Determinants of Democracy, 107 J. POL. ECON. S158 (1999). 
5 Minxin Pei, Is China Democratizing?, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 72–73 (1998). 
6 Id. 
7 See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, Understanding China’s Economic 
Performance, 4 J. POL’Y REF. 1 (2000). 
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One further example that deserves particular attention due to the 
Arab Spring wave of democratization is the tiny East African nation 
of Rwanda. Much of the world’s collective understanding of this state 
is through the lens of the 1994 genocide. For many, it is the only thing 
that comes to mind when the word “Rwanda” is mentioned. However, 
in the years since the genocide the country has been stable and 
growing economically at an impressive rate. In addition, the 
government has set out an ambitious set of goals called “Vision 2020” 
that aims to move the state into international middle income range by 
the year 2020. This is to be accomplished mainly through education 
and the transition to a knowledge-based economy.8 The success of 
this program and of Rwanda over the past decade can only be 
described as incredible.9 
The relevance of Rwanda’s prosperous economy to the recent wave 
of democratization is twofold. First, as will be discussed in 
tremendous detail below, is the extraordinary growth of a country in 
East Africa with no discernible geographic economic advantages that 
has long suffered from many of the ills prevalent on the African 
continent. The second, is that the country is less than two decades 
removed from one of the greatest atrocities in human history. One of 
the draws of Rwanda for foreign direct investment has been described 
as, “[c]ome invest, and be a part of our amazing renaissance.”10 
The importance of this message is that it resonates with countries 
that have thrown off the binds of despotic leadership and taken up the 
mantle of freedom. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, 
tourists (one of the state’s largest sources of income) avoided Egypt 
in droves.11 However, the images of tens of thousands of ordinary 
citizens in Tahrir Square attempting to cast off tyranny were 
broadcast throughout the world, enthralling millions. A time may 
come in a newly democratic Egypt, when the country asks both 
 
8 Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda Vision 
2020 (2000), http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf [hereinafter 
Vision 2020]. 
9 See generally Fareed Zakaria, Zakaria: Africa’s Biggest Success Story, CNN (July 17, 
2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/. 
10 Jeff Chu, Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development, FAST CO. (Apr. 
1, 2009), http://www.fastcompany.com/1208900/rwanda-rising-new-model-economic-
development. 
11 Dina Zayed, Egypt’s Nile Cruises Docked, Awaiting Tourism Recovery, REUTERS, 
Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/uk-egypt-tourism-idUSLNE 
79J02920111020 (tourism provides one in eight jobs in Egypt, but tourist numbers have 
dropped by more than a third compared to previous years). 
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foreign investors and tourists to “come . . . and be a part of [Egypt’s] 
amazing renaissance.”12 
The extraordinary emergence of Rwanda has centered 
predominantly on one man, President Paul Kagame. The Rwandan 
economic miracle is made more impressive by the tremendous lack of 
comparative advantages of the East African nation. While many 
neighboring states are rich in natural resources, Rwanda is not so 
blessed. The country is also landlocked with expensive trade routes. 
As a remedy to these problems President Kagame put forth an 
ambitious economic model based on one model pioneered in 
Singapore.13 
The comparisons between the two states are important for the 
democracy and development paradigm. Both states have democratic 
credentials that are considered to be questionable at best.14 The lack of 
democratic accountability has transcended economics as well. The 
economic models of both states are considered authoritarian and 
tightly controlled.15 
While Mr. Kagame’s vision for the future of Rwanda includes its 
transition into a middle-income nation, it does not include the 
transition to a liberal democracy. While the Rwandan economy has 
blossomed, individual freedoms have not. The international human 
rights organization, Freedom House, in its annual “Freedom in the 
World” study declared Rwanda to be “Not Free” and trending 
downward due to “a severe crackdown on opposition.”16 This view is 
also shared by many international human rights observers. 
Many of Rwanda’s close neighbors and other similarly situated 
developing nations suffer from tremendous corruption, siphoning off 
much needed funds. In contrast, Rwanda has engaged in an aggressive 
anti-corruption effort that has seen a large amount of success. This 
fact has also led to a boon in private foreign direct investment, fueled 
in large part due to personal relationships courted and developed by 
Kagame between himself and prominent international business 
leaders. 
 
12 Chu, supra note 10. 
13 Richard Grant, Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s Redeemer or Ruthless Dictator?, THE 
TELEGRAPH, July 22, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian 
ocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html. 
14 Chu, supra note 10. 
15 Id. 
16 ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2011: THE 
AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY 20 (2011). 
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It is the aim of this Article to examine the Rwandan economic 
model with an eye towards its value in emerging democracies. While 
the Rwandan government is decidedly authoritarian, its development 
of infrastructure, education, and health sectors, along with the 
creation of a niche as a regional telecommunications hub, has created 
economic growth out of the ashes of genocide. In addition, the 
country has experienced economic growth during a prolonged period 
of international recession. However, before this model is exported 
throughout the world, its compatibility with democratic freedoms 
must be determined. If the policy blueprint causes authoritarianism or 
cannot survive alongside democracy, it is useless. If it is compatible 
with democracy, it will have extraordinary implications for the 
continuation of the current wave of democratization and for future 
revolutions from despotism. 
This paper will continue as follows: Part II will provide a 
discussion of the finer points of the Rwandan economy. The 
discussion will focus primarily on the state’s Vision 2020 and the 
programs the vision has brought about. Part III will explain the 
connection between this economic model and authoritarianism. Part 
IV will examine the central focus of the Article, that is, can the 
Rwandan model be useful in emerging democratic societies. Finally, 
Part V will conclude with some thoughts on the implications of the 
research. 
I 
THE RWANDAN ECONOMY AND VISION 2020 
Vision 2020 is an economic advancement program begun in 2000 
by the Rwandan government. Among other things, this program 
envisions the transformation of Rwanda from among the world’s least 
developed nations, with an extreme poverty rate of sixty-four 
percent,17 into a middle income nation by the year 2020,18 in spite of a 
population that would nearly double in that time period.19 
Halfway between the program’s inception and its temporal finality, 
this Part will proceed in two ways. First, there will be a brief 
discussion of the Vision 2020 program and what it envisions, 
including some background as well as the goals of the economic 
scheme itself. Second will be a discussion of on-the-ground 
 
17 Vision 2020, supra note 8, at annex 1. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. at annex 1. 
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implementation. Over the past eleven years, since the inception of 
Vision 2020, how has the Rwandan government achieved such 
economic success and stability? 
A.  Vision 2020 
Vision 2020 emerged in 2000 as a road out of poverty for the 
devastated nation. While some progress had been made at piecing 
together the fragile social fabric of the state, economically there still 
existed tremendous issues. Rwanda, as of 2000, was a strongly 
agricultural state in which the agricultural sector accounted for more 
than ninety percent of the work force. This problem was compounded 
due to a high birth rate and a lack of arable land, threatening 
subsistence rates.20 
The major agricultural products of Rwanda at that time were coffee 
and tea, products that are susceptible to global demand and market 
forces and thus unreliable as the economic backbone of a society.21 
Problems of fluctuating demand and market forces were amplified by 
the existence of natural barriers. As previously mentioned, Rwanda is 
a landlocked nation and has additional transport expenses due to lack 
of infrastructure.22 
In addition to these structural macroeconomic factors, the public 
debt of the nation was an extraordinary impediment to economic 
development. As of 2000 the debt was greater than 115% of the 
country’s GDP.23 A percentage this great today would put the country 
in the top ten international states in public debt.24 As a matter of 
comparison, this level of public debt today would also put the state in 
the range of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), 
economies that currently threaten the collapse of the euro zone.25 
The final major macroeconomic issue of the Rwandan economy in 
2000 was a lack of human capital and capacity. One of the often 
overlooked problems created by the genocide was a deficit in human 
capital. To start, an entire “generation of trained teachers, doctors, 
public servants and private entrepreneurs” was almost completely 
 
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 8. 
24
 The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Public Debt, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186 
rank.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
25 Michael Schuman, How Bad Off Are the PIIGS?, TIME (May 13, 2010), 
http://business.time.com/2010/05/13/how-bad-off-are-the-piigs/. 
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wiped out.26 Additionally, a generation of school-aged children was 
affected; most of the children withdrew from school and were 
affected in profoundly life-changing ways that would forever lessen 
their productivity as economic actors.27 This compounded an already 
near-crisis illiteracy level of fifty-two percent in the East African 
nation.28 
In an effort to remedy these major issues the government put forth 
a three phase plan that would rest on six pillars. In the short-term, 
these problems would be remedied by policies designed to promote 
macroeconomic stability and reduce the economic issues discussed 
above, while attracting foreign direct investment and reducing 
dependency on foreign aid. In the medium-term, the government 
would implement policies designed to transform the country from an 
unsustainable agrarian society to a “knowledge-based economy.”29 
Finally, in the long-term the country would use the macroeconomic 
stability and knowledge-based economy to create a vibrant middle 
class with particular focus on entrepreneurship that could lift the 
country into middle-income status.30 
While the broad vision to transform from an aid-dependent, heavily 
indebted agrarian state to a knowledge-based economy with a bustling 
middle class of entrepreneurs is important, it stands no chance for 
success without actual economic plans. An idealistic image of a future 
where the economy is thriving and out of the depths of poverty does 
the country very little good without pillars of implementation. The 
Vision 2020 program puts forth six pillars that would be implemented 
to achieve goals in the short, medium, and long terms.31 
The first of these pillars is the fostering of good governance and 
the creation of a capable state.32 These concepts include two central 
tenets. First is the instillation of the rule of law in the country.33 This 
includes human rights and protection of the populace without 
discrimination, as well as the accountability and transparency of 
 
26 Vision 2020, supra note 8, at 8. 
27 See generally Richard Akresh & Damien de Walque, Armed Conflict and Schooling: 
Evidence from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide (World Bank Development Research Group, 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4606, 2008). 
28 Vision 2020, supra note 8, at annex 1. 
29 Id. at 9. 
30 Id. at 9–11. 
31 Id. at 11. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 12. 
260 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 253 
government leaders. Additionally, this includes decentralization of 
decision making to allow local communities to determine the best 
solutions to issues that they are closest to. Second is the creation of a 
small, but active, public sector that can devise policies aimed at 
benefiting the sector and making it an internationally competitive 
market economy.34 
The second pillar of development is the development of human 
resources and the transition to a knowledge-based economy.35 As 
previously mentioned, the genocide created a major schism in the 
human resources of Rwanda. Without concerted efforts to remedy this 
situation the state would be doomed to forever find itself on the 
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) list of least 
developed nations. This pillar takes a two-pronged approach to human 
development, with rapid and aggressive policies aimed at bolstering 
the Rwandan educational system as well as the improvement of 
healthcare infrastructure.36 
Pillar number three is a comprehensive program of privatization.37 
According to the plan, “the emergence of a viable private sector that 
can take over as the principle growth engine of the economy, is 
absolutely key.”38 This element also stresses the importance of 
efficiency in the provision of services.39 The plan envisions an 
economy where services that are delivered inefficiently by the 
government are taken out of its hands and given to the private sector, 
thus ensuring the adequate provision of services and promoting the 
long term goal of a vibrant middle class fueled by entrepreneurship.40 
The plan also recognized that the macroeconomic issues of the 
country could not be remedied without improved infrastructure.41 
Improvements in this sector, including greater energy supplies and 
distribution, greater transportation channels, and improved means of 
communication, would make it easier to do business in the country 
and thus improve the potential for investment and entrepreneurship.42 
Efforts have also been made to improve the supply of clean water to 
much of the population and to improve waste management, thus 
 
34 Id. at 15. 
35 Id. at 11. 
36 Id. at 15–18. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Id. at 15. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 18. 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 Id. at 16–17. 
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advancing the human capital the country, and the economy, sorely 
lack.43 
The fifth pillar demands the increase of productivity in the 
agricultural sector, which remains the country’s biggest industry.44 
Unfortunately, the country’s historical link to the agricultural sector 
has not translated to a robust and productive industry. Any effort to 
revamp the Rwandan economy must make sure to include the rural 
farmers, improving their production beyond subsistence levels.45 
The final pillar, and an important one for any burgeoning economy, 
is regional and international integration.46 The Vision 2020 program 
focuses on the liberalization of the trade regime, encouraging and 
protecting foreign direct investment as well as access to foreign 
markets.47 Within this pillar, the government plans to develop a niche 
in information and communication technologies that could be 
exploited across borders.48 
In addition to the six pillars based on sectors of the economy, the 
plan puts forth three cross-cutting visions for the future of Rwanda. 
The first of these is the creation of proactive efforts for gender 
equality.49 As the proverb proclaims, “women hold up half the sky.”50 
Fifty-three percent of the Rwandan population was to be freed-up and 
trained so that they could hold up their half of the sky.51 The second 
cross-cutting vision is the maintenance of the environment and natural 
resources of the country.52 Unsustainable practices create an 
economic disadvantage for future generations who must use resources 
to remedy environmental problems caused by a lack of foresight by 
the current leadership. Finally, the program requires the full 
exploitation of modern science and technology. The maintenance of 
historical methods because of ominous cultural or heritage reasons, 
 
43 Id. at 15–18. 
44 Id. at 11. 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 Id. at 19. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 19–20. 
50 Nicole M. Skalla, China’s One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family 
Planning Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 329, 344 (2004). 
51 Vision 2020, supra note 8, at 19. 
52 Id. 
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despite the creation of new, more efficient methods is economically 
counterproductive.53 
The central question of this paper is, could the model used for 
development by Rwanda be exported to emerging democracies? 
There is little doubt that the image created by the Vision 2020 
program could, in fact, be exported. It aims to limit the inefficiencies 
of government while creating an environment conducive to the 
private sector and entrepreneurship. It similarly aims to advance 
human capital and remedy many issues caused by the genocide. 
While doing all these things, the plan hopes to advance the causes of 
women, maintain the environment, and integrate modern technology 
into all areas of Rwandan economic life. From an economic 
standpoint, this is a spectacularly broad and ambitious vision. From a 
law and development perspective, the implementation is far more 
important. 
B.  Economic Implementation 
In relative contrast to the broad and theoretical future imagined in 
the Vision 2020 program, the economic development of Rwanda 
since the turn of the millennia has followed three distinct and 
important pillars. The first of these pillars is the development of 
human capital. The second is the top-down coordination and the 
control of economic actions from the government, along with 
aggressive anti-corruption campaigns to reduce inefficiencies. The 
final pillar is through the cultivation of personal and business 
relationships, fostering foreign direct investment and private aid. 
The most important resource for the future of any country is its 
population. As previously discussed in great detail, a large swathe of 
the productive population in Rwanda was either wiped out or forced 
to flee during the genocide. This created the necessity to rethink 
educational systems and work towards rebuilding the populace. This 
has been a tremendous success of the Rwandan resurgence. 
The success has come through a concerted effort at the hands of the 
Rwandan government. Education now constitutes one of the largest 
budgetary expenditures at nearly seventeen percent.54 Another 
considerable slice of the budget is dedicated to “nonformal 
 
53 Id. at 20. 
54 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING, ANNEX 
II-3: 2010/2013 STATE EXPENDITURES BY EDPRS PRIORITIES (2011), available at 
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm_send/1918. 
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education.”55 Beyond mere spending, Rwanda has shown many 
indications of broad success in this field. 
The country has experienced not only an explosion in its literacy 
rate,56 but also in the creation of an entrepreneurial culture that was 
envisioned at the outset of the Vision 2020 program.57 This has led to 
a greater transition towards the service-based economy desired at the 
program’s outset. In addition to the aggressive investment in human 
capital to develop an entrepreneurial middle class, the country has 
also developed policies to allow the population to thrive in business. 
This has included the construction of a Special Economic Zone in 
Kigali that is meant to attract investment and foster job creation.58 
Due to inventive and entrepreneurial business practices along with 
pro-business policies, tourism recently overtook coffee and tea 
exports as the country’s largest industry.59 The investment in human 
capital has created a growth in entrepreneurship as imagined by the 
broad economic plan. This has been one tremendous success of the 
Rwandan economic plan. 
The second facet of the implementation of economic policies in 
Rwanda has been aggressive anti-corruption actions along with top-
down coordination efforts to ensure the optimal use of scarce 
resources. The maximization of scarce resources is an extremely 
important goal that is often difficult in developing states for a variety 
of reasons, including rampant corruption and inefficiency.60 While all 
states have finite resources, rich countries, through sheer wealth, are 
able to overcome redundant expenditures and corrupt officials in a 
way that poorer countries cannot. The Rwandan government has 
proven itself to be very aware of this simple fact. 
First, aggressive anti-corruption actions have been taken to root out 
the graft that often accompanies development. This has been done 
 
55 Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, Address before the Am. Ass’n 
for the Advancement of Sci.: Challenges and Prospects of Advancing Science and 
Technology in Africa: The Case of Rwanda, (Feb. 18, 2008), in 322 SCIENCE 545, 547 
(2008). 
56 Rwanda Statistics, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_statistics 
.html (updated July 19, 2012). 
57 See generally Paul Kagame, The Backbone of a New Rwanda: Entrepreneurship is 
the Surest Way, 5 INNOVATIONS 3 (2009). 
58 Rwanda: Investors Rush for Space at Kigali Special Economic Zone, THE NEW 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201109261853.html. 
59 Kagame, supra note 55, at 549. 
60 See generally Adrian Leftwich, Governance, Democracy and Development in the 
Third World, 14 THIRD WORLD Q. 605 (1993). 
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through the creation of an independent anti-corruption agency through 
an official Ombudsman. The Office of Ombudsman allows ordinary 
citizens to report corruption and can refer those cases to the courts or 
prosecutors with an eye towards prosecution.61 This strong and 
independent body has led to some of the lowest levels of corruption in 
East Africa.62 On Transparency International’s annual Corruption 
Perception Index, Rwanda is ranked number sixty-six in the world for 
corruption,63 in stark contrast to neighboring Uganda, which is ranked 
at number 127.64 
Anti-corruption measures have proven to be an important method 
of attracting foreign direct investment in addition to maximizing the 
usefulness of scarce resources. The country has been steadily 
improving in the World Bank’s annual “Doing Business In” reports, 
moving from seventy to fifty-eight in the world for ease of doing 
business from 2010 to 2011.65 The anti-corruption methods are an 
important element of this trend, with now only 20% of companies 
calling corruption a large impediment to doing business in Rwanda.66 
This is extremely low for the African continent, where points of 
comparison include Guinea and The Gambia, at 84% and 52% 
respectively.67 
The second prong of Rwanda’s resource maximization effort is 
through institutional, top-down collaboration. One of the most 
common refrains for critics of development theory is institutional 
redundancy.68 Often times a multitude of international and local 
organizations, as well as government agencies, will attempt to 
alleviate a single problem. The result is wasted resources that could 
be better spent on other issues. The international response to the 
Rwandan genocide is perhaps the greatest historical example of such 
inefficiency, where, in one extreme example, multiple organizations 
 
61 Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L.J. 411, 419 (2006). 
62 James R. Hollyer & Leonard Wantchekon, Corruption in Autocracies 32 (Working 
Paper, 2012), available at https://files.nyu.edu/jrh343/public/Draft3b.pdf. 
63 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, at 13 
(2010) (number one being the least corrupt). 
64 Id. 
65 THE WORLD BANK & THE INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS 4 (2010). 
66 Hollyer & Wantchekon, supra note 62, at 33. 
67 Id. 
68 See generally Leftwich, supra note 60. 
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collected confessions from individual genocidaires, often causing 
them to be legally invalid.69 
This level of inefficient redundancy was something the new 
government of Rwanda set out to completely eliminate.70 The creation 
of a national development plan (Vision 2020) was just the beginning 
of the plan. In addition to pointing all governmental agencies towards 
the same economic and development goals, the government also 
forced non-governmental actors to get on board.71 Under this policy, 
foreign civil society groups and non-governmental organizations are 
required to tender to the government “annual action plans and 
reports.”72 These plans are used to continually remind non-
governmental actors to align their plans and goals with those of the 
government. A failure to make this adjustment can result in a variety 
of punishments, including expulsion from the country.73 
Finally, the economy has grown through the cultivation of personal 
business relationships that result in tremendous private investment 
into the country’s burgeoning industries. The development of these 
relationships is based in large part on the charisma of the country’s 
President, Paul Kagame. Mr. Kagame has made a point to befriend 
many wealthy and influential investors who have subsequently 
invested in and donated heavily to the country. 
The list of Kagame’s supporters includes Bill Gates, CEOs and 
former CEOs of prominent companies such as Starbucks and Google, 
and the influential pastor Rick Warren.74 These relationships are 
immensely important for a state with a GDP equal to about sixty 
percent of the quarterly earnings of Google and less than half of the 
annual revenues of Starbucks.75 Through these relationships a number 
 
69 Barbara Oomen, Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda, 36 
DEV. & CHANGE 887, 897, 899 (2005). 
70 Davis Rutagony, Rwanda: Inefficiency, the Ugly Cousin of Corruption in Public 
Procurement, THE NEW TIMES (May 1, 2005), http://allafrica.com/stories/200505020469 
.html. 




75 The World Factbook, Rwanda: Economy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html (last updated 
Sept. 2012) (the 2011 Rwanda GDP, at the official exchange rate, was $6 billion); Google 
Investor Relations, Google, Inc. 2012 Financial Tables, http://investor.google.com 
/financial/tables.html (in 2011, Google’s earnings were $9.7 billion); Starbucks Investor 
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of economic opportunities and successes have emerged. One classic 
example of this development strategy involves a visit to the country 
by the CEO of Costco at the behest of President Kagame. This visit 
became a personal friendship, and Costco now purchases nearly 
twenty-five percent of the country’s coffee crop.76 The next time that 
Kagame returned to the United States, a party was thrown for him by 
the CEO of Costco, which turned into a business relationship with 
Starbucks, now the second largest corporate purchaser of Rwandan 
coffee.77 
Such relationships and support occur for a mix of reasons. One 
reason is the charisma of Kagame and his ability to court business 
relationships through individual contact. Another, undoubtedly, is the 
ability of Kagame to invoke the guilt that riddled the international 
community for its inaction during the genocide.78 Whatever the 
individual reason may be, these personal relationships have helped 
transition the country from a state broken after the genocide to a gem 
of development. 
II 
CONNECTION BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE ECONOMY 
When one contrasts the grand scheme posed by the Vision 2020 
program with its implementation, it can be concluded that the 
implementation follows the main policy points of the initiative. First, 
there are significant investments in human capital that will create a 
greater future for Rwanda. An educated populace will create a spirit 
of entrepreneurship, grow private industry, and lift the economy out 
of poverty. One can already see the footholds of this plan beginning 
to develop. 
In contrast to the private sector-led development scheme, however, 
is the tremendous control of the economy that the government exerts. 
It is clear this was the intention of the government, given their 
admiration for the Singaporean model.79 While no one can seriously 
question the importance of collaboration or anti-corruption in 
development efforts, it is important to examine the implications that 
such control has in other areas of Rwandan life. It is possible that 
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such control is damaging to freedoms and liberties and thus would be 
incompatible with emerging democracies. First, in an effort to do this, 
it is necessary to clarify what it is precisely about the model that has 
such a connection to authoritarianism. 
In a word, the connection of this economic model to 
authoritarianism is consolidation. The government-directed economic 
development scheme creates a singular source of power that 
transcends sectors and creates a vacuum in civil society that stumps 
the democratic process.80 The consolidation of power in Rwanda in 
the hands of a small group of individuals has created the groundwork 
for an authoritarian state in which both the public and private sectors 
are controlled almost exclusively by President Kagame and other 
former members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.81 Let us examine 
individual elements of this consolidation. 
As previously mentioned, a fundamental element of the Rwandan 
economic success is the exceptional levels of coordination that have 
existed. This allows the government to control the means of 
development and economic growth without regard to the sector or 
source of funds, from government investment, to private industry, to 
the distribution of foreign aid under the threat of expulsion. 
A side effect of this lack of economic policy space is the 
destruction of any democratic policy space. As described in Vision 
2020 and highly touted in international media, there has been a 
movement to decentralize government in Rwanda.82 This is in an 
effort to ensure both efficiency and increase the ability of those most 
affected by decisions to make them. This movement appears to be 
somewhat of a smokescreen, as those who put forth policy outside the 
official government line often disappear without explanation or 
investigation.83 
Perhaps even more troubling is the exploitation of the much 
discussed law of “divisionism.” Under this law, individuals can be 
harshly punished for vague crimes of “fostering division” between 
ethnic groups or for advocating genocide. In reality, the law has been 
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exploited to hold opposition politicians and dissenters in prison for 
long periods without regard to the rule of law or due process.84 
Simply put, in Rwanda, opposition is not tolerated.85 
The second authoritarian facet of the Rwandan economy that has 
been similarly vital for development is the international prominence 
of Kagame and his ability to develop individual relationships. As 
discussed previously, the interpersonal level has been vital for the 
emergence of the East African nation. This individual importance 
further consolidates power in the hands of one person and a tight 
inner circle. 
When viewed together, the importance of personal connections 
between President Kagame and prominent international donors and 
investors, the crushing of political dissent, and the destruction of civil 
society creates a clear picture of consolidation of power and capacity. 
Dissent and civil society are crushed at home, limiting the political 
space by which those opposed to government policy can act 
domestically. By individualizing the relationships that bring all-
important development dollars into the country, the leadership is 
made ever more vital to the country’s progress. Domestic actions 
ensure that no other viable option is presented to the populace while 
international lobbying and personal relationships ensure that the 
leadership is vital and, potentially, irreplaceable. 
The discussion above demonstrates the danger of the Rwandan 
model. The tight top-down control consolidates economic power and 
policy-making into a few hands. Along with this consolidation, the 
focus on coordination of economic policy ensures that the country 
accepts the control and punishes those who refuse to accept the 
government’s plan. At the same time, the international and personal 
actions of the leadership are vital in ensuring the continual flow of 
international money into the developing country. The strong 
interconnectedness of economics and politics, along with the tight 
control of the economy, breeds consolidation of political power as 
well, with the added weapon of “divisionism” accusations towards 
dissenters. 
While the model presented has been economically successful, it is 
also dangerous for emerging democracies. The transition to a 
knowledge-based economy that is buoyed by a strong private sector 
of entrepreneurs and government investment in human capital and 
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infrastructure is clearly capable of creating wealth and opportunity for 
developing nations. The interpersonal skills of a strong and 
charismatic leader also assist in bringing foreign aid and investment 
to emerging economies. Finally, in order to maximize the use of finite 
resources, coordination and anti-corruption efforts are imperative for 
development. However, the top-down coordination and potentially 
irreplaceable nature of the leadership consolidates power in a manner 
that is dangerous to democracies. Additionally, the importance placed 
on coordination and anti-corruption gives leaders a built-in method to 
punish opposition or dissenters, simply by accusing them of 
endangering economic coordination or corruption. This begs the 
question: can the model be used in transitioning societies without 
endangering the fresh democratic fibers? 
III 
COULD THE MODEL BE SUCCESSFUL IN A DEMOCRACY? 
This brings us to the core of the Article. The economic model 
presented by Rwanda is clearly a successful one. The country’s 
economy has been growing at an astounding rate, even during a 
global economic downturn.86 While the recent wave of 
democratization that swept through the Middle East and North Africa 
gained much attention due to the calls for freedom and liberty, the 
Arab Spring began in large part due to calls for employment and 
opportunities.87 If the Rwandan model can be exported and 
successfully adapted to emerging democracies, its rapid transition and 
growth could have tremendous implications for the future of the 
revolutions. It is important for the continuation of democratic 
advancement that the economy continues to develop for the benefit of 
the masses.88 
Unfortunately for individual countries from Morocco to Syria, and 
the wider movement itself, history has shown no perfect blueprint for 
the transition from despotism to democratic rule. Democracies are 
ever evolving entities with constant slides towards and away from 
true popular and republican representation. This slide can be 
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exacerbated by any number of events, individuals, or contexts that are 
unique to the histories of individual countries. 
History has shown one imperfect, though successful, road from 
revolution to democracy. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict and 
even more difficult to plan for. This road is the personal touch. Just as 
Kagame plays a vital role in the economic development of Rwanda, 
there are many examples throughout history of the importance that 
individuals play in transitional and international politics. 
It is often the case for states in transition or revolution that one 
individual is placed at the forefront of history. This can be a military 
leader such as George Washington in the American Revolution or a 
symbol of the struggle such as Nelson Mandela in the South African 
transition from apartheid. These individuals often have tremendous 
influence that eclipses the popularity and strength of the new 
government. 
While the above two individuals chose to relinquish power and 
instead set the precedent of the peaceful and constitutional transition 
that so embodies democracy, far too many others have not. One 
prominent example is Robert Mugabe, who, coming from his 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) postcolonial revolution 
was immensely popular,89 took over the presidency and maintained 
his grip on power through progressively repressive means.90 
Whether a revolutionary hero or founding father will voluntarily 
relinquish power is an extremely personal decision and a matter of 
luck to be debated by historians. While some countries have been 
fortunate enough to have their transitions transformed and continued 
by a leader willing to peacefully and constitutionally step down from 
power, far more countries have been cursed with a revolutionary 
leader that opts against ceding power. It is an unfortunate occurrence 
that many more societies have found the process of democratization 
doomed by a Mugabe, rather than sustained by a Mandela. 
There are, however, many variables that can influence this decision 
both positively and negatively. As discussed above, the Rwandan 
economic model brings about a situation that could be conducive to a 
slide towards authoritarianism. However, this situation is but one 
variable in a vast cadre of democratic and anti-democratic elements. 
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Simply because an emerging democracy has adopted the Rwandan 
model does not necessarily mean it will become an autocracy that 
ignores fundamental rights and freedoms, just as a lack of adoption 
cannot decisively avoid tyranny. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage to the wide range of variables for 
the success of democratization is the wide range of potential solutions 
and inducements to democracy. Two broad categories of these 
solutions are important for the adoption of the Rwandan economic 
model in emerging democracies. First, there are those that assist in the 
protection of human rights. In Rwanda, the curtailing of human and 
political rights has been a major issue.91 Second is the all-important 
inducement for the leader who is so vital in the economic progression: 
to follow constitutional guidelines and relinquish power. The leader 
thus sets a precedent and allows the country’s democratic transition to 
blossom along with the economic progress he or she has been a huge 
part of.92 
Unfortunately, these are not simple issues. The first issue is a 
particularly difficult one. Academics, practitioners, and policy makers 
can dedicate entire lives and careers to the question of how to force a 
country to adhere to its domestic and international human and civil 
rights obligations. The same can be said of the question of transition. 
No blueprint exists to ensure the transition to democracy is a smooth 
one. This Article does not, and indeed cannot, attempt to serve as a 
comprehensive guide to all of the successful (or unsuccessful) means 
of ensuring human and political rights obligations are met, or 
ensuring that a revolutionary or transitional leader steps down when 
his allotted time is done. Instead, in an attempt to complete the broad 
policy presented in this Article, I would like to briefly survey methods 
related to the economic development model detailed above, including 
the coordination and anti-corruption efforts, the influx of money and 
international influence, and the post-atrocity recovery. 
First, in an effort to ensure that the coordination and anti-
corruption efforts are not used as a pretext to attack dissenters, the 
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most important societal element is a competent, independent, and 
impartial judiciary that is empowered with full judicial review.93 The 
question of judicial independence in Rwanda is a hotly contested one, 
with many opponents accusing President Kagame of meddling in the 
affairs of the judicial branch.94 
This is important for a variety of reasons. The first is that judicial 
review of executive actions would create a measure of protection 
against the use of anti-corruption and coordination efforts to merely 
silence dissenters and opponents of the regime. It bears repeating that 
the importance of coordination and anti-corruption measures in 
economic development cannot be overstated. However, those 
measures must be necessary to both coordinate and stem out 
corruption; they cannot merely be a pretext for the abrogation of 
human and political rights and the destruction of opposition parties. 
Similar review should be exercised in regards to the expulsion of 
foreign aid groups that bolster civil society. In Rwanda, it is possible 
for such groups to be expelled from the country if they do not 
adequately coordinate with government development goals.95 These 
decisions cannot be immune from review. It is important that an 
independent body be able to examine and potentially overturn such 
decisions if they are made as a pretext for the silencing of opposition 
or the destruction of an independent civil society. 
An independent judiciary with a robust power of judicial review is 
vital to coordination and anti-corruption efforts. The regime would be 
able to coordinate development efforts and limit corruption, however, 
these broad powers would not be allowed to become a pretext for the 
curbing of human and political rights or the destruction of political 
dissent. This includes both domestic and foreign groups. By 
subjecting a significant part of the government’s internal police force 
to judicial review, the consolidation of power would not go 
unchecked. 
For a real world example of this phenomenon, one need only look 
to the current situation in Iraq. De-Baathification was a form of 
lustration aimed at eradicating the influence of the former regime. 
This goal had wide support, but the organization created to 
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accomplish it, the Supreme Commission for Accountability and 
Justice (AJC), was accused of overstepping its bounds and merely 
using the process for sectarian political gain. Senior members of the 
Iraqi government went as far as to question the legitimacy of the 
AJC’s actions.96 
As chronicled by former Legal Advisers for the United States 
Embassy in Baghdad, Charles Trumbull IV and Julie Martin, in the 
wake of this accusation, the Iraqi judiciary stepped in and issued an 
ultimatum to the AJC. Either the body could change its course, or the 
Court of Cassation would review all of its files and decisions.97 The 
AJC responded to this proposal by changing its course and removing 
a good portion of the sectarian political posturing from the electoral 
vetting process.98 
An important lesson for Rwanda can be drawn from the Iraqi 
experience discussed above. Just as no one can doubt the importance 
of anti-corruption or coordination efforts put forth by a developing 
nation, no one can seriously doubt the importance of removing the 
influence of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party from Iraqi politics. In 
Rwanda, the government attempts to achieve its goal through 
immense top down coordination efforts that force all parties to fall in 
line and a corruption watchdog with immense power and little 
oversight. Iraq’s de-Baathification process was done by an executive 
body known as the AJC. In both cases it is vital that an independent 
judiciary be allowed oversight and review of the decisions made by 
the body to prevent them from devolving into a weapon for an 
authoritarian government or a tool of partisan politics. 
While the development of an independent and impartial judiciary is 
difficult, it is important for all societies in transition. That gives it a 
universal applicability and thus a measure of predictability. While 
there are many facets of transitioning countries that are not easily 
exportable, the necessity of an independent and impartial judiciary is 
one that must be. A modern democracy cannot exist without an 
independent judiciary, and judicial review has become an 
indispensable element of an independent judiciary.99 
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That is precisely what makes the second round of solutions so 
difficult. While the independence of the judiciary and judicial review 
are important in all democratic societies for the respect of human 
rights, the inducement of a powerful and popular leader to step down 
is more individual. What causes a leader to stay in power after he or 
she is constitutionally obligated to step aside is based on personal 
preferences and motives. In this regard, no situation is exactly 
identical to any other situation. What could induce the leader of a 
democratic transition in one country to step down from the leadership 
position they occupy may have no effect on another leader in another 
country. 
As no two scenarios are identical, potential solutions must rely on 
common themes and elements. Over the next few paragraphs, these 
common elements will be identified and general solutions will be 
proposed. Each of these solutions, while grounded in historical 
precedent and policy, should be viewed as nothing more than 
hypothetical, as the variability in individual situations cannot be 
overemphasized. 
The first such inducement is one that is commonly overlooked in 
the developed world. That is, the financial element of leaving 
leadership. While most residents of the developed world are 
accustomed to former heads of state leaving power and having 
tremendous financial security, it is an unfortunately common 
occurrence in the developing world that stepping down from power 
leaves one without the same level of comfort. This can cause leaders 
to embezzle public funds during their stint as leader or refuse to give 
up power peacefully when the time has come. 
One of the most prominent efforts to alleviate this problem is the 
Ibrahim Prize from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. This prize is given 
out to African leaders for good governance; however, they must have 
been democratically elected, left their office within the 
constitutionally mandated time limit, and left office within the three 
previous years.100 This is one attempt to induce leaders who would 
otherwise use extra-constitutional means to maintain their office and 
continue to live a certain lifestyle to instead leave office with hopes of 
winning the large monetary prize and thus being able to maintain that 
lifestyle without resorting to extra-constitutional means. 
Such a prize does not require a particularly large sum of money. 
The Ibrahim Prize is initially $5 million given over ten years and an 
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endowment of $200,000 annually for the remainder of the leader’s 
life.101 This type of prize could easily be repeated in other areas of the 
world through international fundraising and non- or 
intergovernmental organization executorship. It could have significant 
effects in reducing or eliminating one reason for democratically 
elected leaders staying past their constitutionally mandated term 
limits. 
Another common reason that democratic transitions are stunted 
through a leader’s refusal to leave peacefully is for security concerns, 
either actual or concocted. Setting aside the common tactic of despots 
to justify horrific acts and refuse to obey the constitution based on 
concocted stories of danger to the fabric of the state and other 
purposes, there are many real reasons for this. In the case of Rwanda, 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army, headed by now-President 
Kagame, committed horrific acts in the name of securing the 
vulnerable Tutsi population in the waning days of the genocide.102 If 
President Kagame were to feel that the Tutsis were still not secure 
from the majority Hutus, it is feasible that he will stay past his 
constitutionally mandated exit. 
The same is possible for those with genuine fears of the destruction 
of the burgeoning republic. While he would eventually leave willingly 
and set a precedent for term limits, George Washington was 
convinced to stay an extra term, after intending to retire after a single 
term, based on the potential fracture of the new republic.103 The 
prevalence of extra-constitutional means of regime change, especially 
in new democracies, has shown us that there are many times when 
this fear is a justifiable one. 
The question then, is how a fragile, often weak new state can 
guarantee both its security and the security of vulnerable populations 
in a manner that will deprive the potential extra-constitutional leader 
of an excuse or necessity to stay in power. Just like many of the issues 
posed in this Part, this is a near impossible question. For the purposes 
of this Article, it is enough to simply say that there is no definite step 
that can be taken to insure a leader will feel as though he or she must 
leave. Each individual situation is unique and demands to be handled 
differently, however, plans cannot be made for those individuals that 
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will always choose to remain in power after their term is up. The most 
that can be done is through efforts to strengthen society and protect 
vulnerable populations, thus removing the pretense of security 
concerns that will allow for the continuation of power beyond the 
allotted time and the stunting of fragile democratic institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The past decade has seen the rise of Rwanda as a regional 
economic powerhouse. This tremendous growth came from the ashes 
of one of the greatest atrocities in human history. Rwanda’s success 
gives hope to impoverished nations with no natural competitive 
advantages throughout the world. 
Rwanda does, however, stand out historically. While a great deal of 
scholarly and policy debate has focused on the constant connection 
between economic growth and democracy, Rwanda has thrived 
despite an authoritarian government that is devoid of respect for 
human and political rights and opposition. In fact, the authoritarian 
nature of the government has played an important role in the 
country’s economic emergence. 
This dichotomy, authoritarian governance and rapid economic 
growth, generates an important question for many countries in the 
developing world: can countries that have recently experienced 
tribulations, be they civil war, revolution, transition from oppression, 
or otherwise, adopt the Rwandan model of economic growth? Can 
Rwanda’s top-down and tightly controlled economic system thrive in 
an emerging democracy? 
An analysis of the Rwandan system along with its connection to 
authoritarianism gives important insight into this question. It may not 
be that the system itself is only compatible with authoritarian 
governance, however; it may be that the economic model is 
conducive to a slide towards authoritarianism. As a country 
transitions from atrocity or oppression towards popular 
representation, there are any number of factors that will determine 
whether that country will stumble into authoritarianism or continue 
with democratization. The adoption of the Rwandan system that 
stresses coordination, anti-corruption, and personal relationships may 
be one negative factor. 
It should be noted that the success of the Rwandan model creates a 
Catch-22 in its movement towards authoritarian politics. Similar to 
the much stated axiom of capitalism that the middle class bears 
2012] Kagame’s Rwanda: Can an Authoritarian Development 277 
Model Be Squared with Democracy and Human Rights? 
democracy,104 the success of the model in creating an entrepreneurial 
class may reduce both the tolerance and the necessity for tight 
coordination and top-down control in all facets of society.105 
A similar argument can be made with respect to security. As 
mentioned above, history shows us no shortage of examples where a 
transitional government or military placeholder justified a power grab 
based on security of the burgeoning republic or on a vulnerable 
populace. However, economic growth has a stabilizing effect. As a 
country becomes wealthy and the standard of living increases, 
democratic leanings and security of the fabric of the nation also 
increase.106 A country that is stabilized due to a growing economy is 
not as vulnerable to authoritarian power grabs based on real security 
concerns. 
Both of these pro-democracy elements, however, are created in the 
medium- to long-term while the top-down coordination, anti-
corruption measures, and fundamental importance of an individual are 
created immediately upon the adoption of the model. The economic 
growth that Rwanda has experienced is fundamentally good for 
democracy, but aspects of the model are pro-authoritarianism. 
Thus, a fundamental dichotomy is created. The Rwandan model 
could potentially work in democratizing societies without creating 
great movement towards authoritarianism, and in the long run could 
even aid democratization. However, those countries that are 
particularly in danger, whether it is from immense and crushing 
poverty, a history of extra-constitutional regime change, or a variety 
of other factors, may not be able to withstand the initial pro-
authoritarian elements. Those countries that could weather the initial 
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